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Both the ATA Headquarters and the ATA National Chapters have proven to be important partners to NATO's Public Diplomacy Division

Tacan Ildem
NATO Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, Brussels, 3 December 2017

Cyber security is one of the biggest challenges of our time. ATA is exceptionally well-timed

Julian King
European Commissioner for Security Union, European Parliament, 28 June 2017

We appreciate the contribution made by the Atlantic Treaty Association in promoting a better understanding of the Alliance among our nations

Warsaw Summit Communiqué
Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016
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Public Discussion with NATO Deputy Secretary General, Athens 2 March 2018
PUBLISHED: March 22, 2018
The Deputy Secretary General of NATO the Honorable Rose Gottemoeller in Public discussion with the Greek Civil Society and the younger generation, hosted by the GREEK ASSOCIATION FOR ATLANTIC & EUROPEAN in cooperation with Women In International Security (WIIS)-Hellas   On the occasion of the first official visit to Greece of the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, the Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation (G.A.A.E.C.) in cooperation with Women in International Security (WIIS)-Hellas organized a flashing event on Friday 2 March 2018, at the Ministry of Digital Policy Telecommunications and Media Conference Hall. Ms. Gottemoeller spoke on “The NATO you might not know-security and defense beyond the old basics” followed   by a debate with the over 200 participants, of Government officials, Ambassadors from many countries and the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Officials of the Hellenic Armed Forces, Police and Coast Guard, representatives of Women Organizations, NGOs, think tanks, University professors, but also a large number of University students, young military officers and the students –attaches of the Diplomatic Academy with their Director, Ambassador Ioannis Papameletiou. The President of the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation, Mr. Theodossis Georgiou welcomed the Deputy Secretary General citing the role of GAAEC in providing a “forum” for discussion as “public support can provide legitimacy to the goals of the Alliance, but public support requires an educated and informed public, and this in one of the missions of G.A.A.E.C. and our Atlantic Associations.’’ The Secretary General of the Ministry of Digital Policy, Telecommunications and Media, Mr. Georgios Florentis, welcomed The D.S.G. and mentioned that “this has been the second time in less than a year that the Greek Association for Atlantic and European Cooperation has been welcomed at this auditorium, meaning that Mr. Theodossis Georgiou and Dr. Aliki Mitsakos accomplish an extraordinary job to the purposes of the Transatlantic Cooperation. Since the beginning of NATO, Greece remains one of the most credible members of the alliance and a key player to the promotion of stability that NATO represents today. Discussions/Panels like this one today contribute the most to this promotion.” Dr. Aliki Mitsakos, Dean of The International Center for Leading Studies (TICLS) representing WIIS-Hellas referred to the implementation of U.N. 1325 by NATO and the appointment of the first female D.S.G. and second most senior civilian in the hierarchy of NATO, connecting the event with the approaching Women’s International Day. Dr. Mitsakos referring also to the first Police Lt. General Z. Tsirigoti, present, that they have worked hard not only in their field of expertise but also in their broader environment, stressing the importance of security on the human level, particularly for the women and children as the more exposed section of the population, but that gender must not be an obstacle in attaing goals. She also presented the outstanding CV of the honorary Speaker beyond major Think Tanks as the  Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance and the chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with the Russian Federation, which entered into force on February 5, 2011 and is currently in implementation. The D.S.G. of NATO Ms. Rose Gottemoeller set out the Alliance’s essential role in a more uncertain world, highlighting the value of Allies’ collective efforts and thanked Greece for its contributions to NATO activities, so security is ensured in the eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans. Going through a few examples of where “NATO gets beyond the normal notion of collective defense, the NATO you might not know”, the first one is an area where Greece has played an enormous role, and that is in the combatting of illegal human trafficking. “what we are doing in NATO, we are going to be focusing on this problem over the next two years, in a work programme that will intensify our efforts, to develop a wider and wider spectrum of work, together with a number of different communities,  on tackling these important and very severe problems for humanity. But, with Greece's help, NATO has already been working in the Aegean and the Mediterranean to combat illegal human trafficking. Since 2016, NATO’s deployment in the Aegean Sea has helped curb illegal and dangerous human trafficking, working with Greece, also with Turkey and the EU’s border agency, Frontex. Second, our deployment provides an additional platform for cooperation among Greece, Turkey and the European Union, regarding the refugee and migrant crisis. And third, this is another success story of cooperation between NATO and the EU per se, working more closely than ever before and will continue to do so. I know there's been a lot in the media recently about defence cooperation being built up in the EU, and whether there's a competitive angle with NATO. I truly see a new era of cooperation developing between NATO, on one side of Brussels, and the European Union on the other side of Brussels.” Talking more about  UN Security Council Resolution 1325 as we approach International Women's Day on March 8th, “this is something that is year round for the NATO Alliance. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO leaders acknowledged that the integration of gender perspectives contributes to a more modern, ready and responsive NATO. Gender is an important focus of NATO's cooperation with other international organisations, once again, the EU and the United Nations, and also with civil society, so I am glad to see that there are so many representatives of civil society here today. Put simply, we believe very strongly that peace is best secured through inclusion. Today, NATO is working to ensure that gender perspectives are incorporated into all aspects of policy, doctrine and training. This is not only the right thing to do, but it is also the smart thing to do. It's how you get more effectiveness out of your military forces, if you have everyone working together in this way.” The former Assistant Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador ad.h. Mr. Thrasyvoulos Stamatopoulos commented on his experience in NATO and how the work done “is a bit like an iceberg, you only see the top one-third and there's a lot going on below.Let me amplify a little on what you mentioned, but there's so much more along these lines like working on children and conflict working with organizations like the OSCE and even the Red Cross.” Dialogue, he said, “complements the totality of what NATO has become, not so much a defense organization or not only, but a broader security and a political military organization. not only a military organization.” The second part on the event was an interesting and vital discussion with the participants. Mrs Zeta Makri President of the Women Political Association, former member of Government and the Hellenic Parliament, opened the discussion with a question about the implementation of UN resolution 1325 in NATO and the integration of gender aspects into the security sector. Students, but also Ambassadors ad.h. Georgios Kaklikis and Karolos Gadis, contributed to the discussion with questions relating to the current unstable security situation particularly in the Aegean, referring to the recent incidents with the neighboring country, as well as on the NATO EU relations. Ms. Gottemoeller responded straightforwardly, to all issues raised. In regard to Turkey and their stance in the South East Mediterranean she responded that NATO is a big family and any family is not without disputes, and the message from NATO headquarters is to try to facilitate the solution of serious problems by discussion, emphasizing that that NATO is an alliance that operates through consensus around the table. Asked about Putin's earlier announcements of new nuclear weapons in Russia she said that the US anti-ballistic shield is against North Korean aggression rather than Moscow and were not designed to in any way counter the Russian strategic offensive deterrence. Mrs. Gottemoeller called it "a bit of a non-sequitur" to say U.S. missile defense systems had been made ineffective, as they had been designed with North Korea, not Russia in mind, adding "it's the balance of strategic offensive forces that keeps the peace, not an attempt by one side or the other to defend against missiles." Questions from the younger participants included the gender perspective as in “As a woman who is a leading position, you may have faced a lot of difficulties. I guess it is quite interesting for us young women to hear all these difficulties and maybe a few advice” the advice being “never apologize” for a question, citing her experience from College, and the youth query in “what exactly does NATO do for young people and what are the opportunities that it has to offer?” saying “there are several ways that you can come and see what NATO is all about and really help us to move into the future”, related to the Internship program, among others. Ms. Rose Gottemoeller summed up thanking the great audience for “the opportunity to talk with you. I wish we had more time for questions and answers, but fantastic questions” adding “I do hope to see you at some point in NATO”. More information on NATO Deputy Secretary General to visit Greece here
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
NATO's Cyber Defence Pledge: Cyber threats
PUBLISHED: March 21, 2018
Cyber has come of age and now has the ability to threaten whole states in ways that, until very recently, were unimaginable. Simon Michell explains how the politics, economics and infrastructure of nation states is coming under fire from hostile cyber forces The trouble with cyber threats is that no one really understands them or is able to predict their full impact until it is too late. Even senior military figures will admit that they do not know what a full, all-out attack on a military network or unit might look like, or what it could achieve. This is a massive problem, especially as cyber intrusions are increasingly being used in conjunction with the awesome power of social media. The implications of this are slowly becoming clear. The unauthorised access into the United States Democratic National Committee computer network has been attributed to Russian hackers carrying out a coordinated attempt to influence the outcome of the 2017 US presidential election. This is the first known occasion that a foreign state has attempted such a devious plot against the US. It is difficult to ascertain whether the cyber campaign was successful or not, and even if it was in fact a state-sponsored activity. Nevertheless, it has been focusing minds in Europe ahead of critical national elections, such as those recently concluded in France and Germany. Germany has concluded that a hybrid campaign, designed to destabilise the political foundations of the country, may well have been in progress for some time. Part of this operation included the very deliberate ‘Lisa’ scandal that played out at the beginning of January 2016. False allegations that a Russian-German 13-year-old girl from Berlin, Lisa, was abducted and raped by immigrants of a ‘southern’ complexion resulted in protestors taking to the streets to rail against the dangers of the rapidly growing immigrant population. The erroneous reports of the alleged incident, which were broadcast by television journalist Ivan Blagoy on Russia’s TV Channel One, circulated like wildfire on social media and the internet. DESIGNED TO DESTROY A year prior to the ‘Lisa’ scandal, France witnessed the potential catastrophe that a well-targeted and planned cyberattack could bring about. TV5Monde was on the brink of being completely taken off air by a sophisticated cyberattack. The director general of the French TV channel, Yves Bigot, confirmed in an interview with the BBC that, “We were a couple of hours from having the whole station gone for good.” The attack was coordinated and designed to destroy the station. Originally thought to have been perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists, it has since been suggested that the attack was the work of the Russian APT28 group, also known as FancyBear or Sofacy. APT28 was identified by the American cybersecurity company FireEye as far back as 2007. According to FireEye, APT28 is a very active and well-organised cyber unit that appears to have evolved its tactics into prosecuting “information operations commensurate with broader strategic military doctrine”. The head of the German Domestic Intelligence Service, BfV (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), Dr Hans- Georg Maaßen, told the BBC that he believes that APT28/Sofacy has attacked the German parliament, as well as Angela Merkel’s CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) party, in order to destabilise the German political system. Bruno Kahl, president of the German Federal Intelligence Agency (BND), agrees, saying, “We have evidence of cyberattacks that have no other purpose than triggering political uncertainty.” Two days before Christmas 2015, a cyberattack on Ukrainian SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems belonging to three energy organisations left more than 225,000 customers without electricity for hours. The attack was carefully planned, conducted with precision and enabled through months of cyber reconnaissance of the energy companies’ IT networks. When the attack was triggered, not only was the primary power system neutralised, back-up systems were also deactivated. Nobody has claimed responsibility for the attack, and there is much speculation as to the reason it took place. Ominously, the attack was not designed to destroy the grid, but merely to take it offline temporarily. It was a reminder to Ukraine that its ability to provide heat and light to its citizens was no longer guaranteed. This is a message that could have been much starker had the attack chosen to obliterate the grid entirely. There is no doubt that the cyber threat, initially aimed at individuals or companies primarily for financial gain, has morphed into something much more damaging. State-sponsored hackers are not only stealing other nations’ secrets, they have now begun to undermine their democratic frameworks. In a speech at St Andrews University about the cyber threat, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Michael Fallon, warned, “Russia is clearly testing NATO and the West. It is undermining national security for many allies and the international rules-based system.” Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Projecting Stability: Crisis management: projecting stability and strengthening security
PUBLISHED: March 16, 2018
Floods, fires, refugees, airspace incursions and instability on its borders are all crises that NATO is dealing with on a daily basis. Simon Michell highlights how the Alliance has established a process, methodology and skill set to deal with some of the most intractable challenges on the planet From its origins in ancient Greek, a ‘crisis’ is the turning point that a disease reaches when either recovery or death of the patient will occur. Nowadays, the term is generally used to describe volatile disagreements between countries, ethnic groupings and, on occasions, non-state actors that have the potential to descend into armed conflict. Although crises can be manipulated so that they fester on indefinitely, they can also be short-lived events during which the right decisions, taken at the right time, can resolve the predicament and bring back the tranquillity that preceded it relatively quickly. Crises, however, are by no means exclusively military in nature. They also occur when a humanitarian disaster unfolds that threatens to spread not just misery, but also regional instability. Again, swift and decisive action can shorten the suffering and ease the tensions. Another, and much more modern, cause for crises relates to our growing dependence on technology and infrastructure. When these are destabilised, damaged or destroyed, tragedy can ensue within hours. THE NATO CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS NATO prides itself on being a crisis management organisation. This is not an aspirational vision statement; rather, it reflects current activity. Approximately 18,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO crisis management missions in Afghanistan, Africa, Kosovo, the Mediterranean and now, increasingly, in the Black Sea Region. When a crisis regarded as requiring, or potentially benefitting, from a NATO response is identified, political authorization from the member states’ national governments is sought before any planning, deployments or use of military force takes place. This authorisation is derived through the principal decisionmaking body – the North Atlantic Council (NAC) – which reaches decisions on a consensus basis. However, before arriving at a conclusion, it can call upon the support of an overarching NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) process that draws upon a range of supporting elements. These include the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Crisis Management Arrangements, the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS) and NATO’s Operational Planning Process. NATO’s involvement in helping to resolve and contain the multiple conflicts that arose out of the break up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s has not only kept it operationally active in the Balkans, it has also helped the Alliance develop a process and structure to better identify other crises as they evolve, in order to tailor an appropriate and bespoke response. This methodology has been refined over the years as crisis management has developed into a core NATO competence – the importance of which was underlined in the 2010 New Strategic Concept: “NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.” To this day, that is what NATO is still doing in Kosovo as part of its KFOR mission, which began in June 1999. The Balkans conflicts highlight NATO’s willingness to assist nations and populations that do not belong to the Alliance. NATO is also an enthusiastic supporter of the African Union’s (AU) growing peacekeeping role and has provided a range of training and transport assistance. Back in 2005, NATO helped the AU in Darfur, Sudan. Today, the Alliance is helping the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing strategic airlift and sealift. Another collaborative activity is taking place between NATO and Europe’s border agency, Frontex, in response to the growing refugee and migrant crisis. STAYING ONE STEP AHEAD The border lands between Russia and NATO have become an area into which NATO has been projecting stability for many years. The Baltic Air Patrols that defend the airspace of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are typical examples of pre-emptive measures taken to lessen the likelihood of an unauthorized intrusion resulting in a deeper crisis. The Baltic Air Patrols are the most high-profile air defence missions of this nature, but they are not the only ones. NATO also patrols the skies above NATO members Albania and Slovenia to compensate for their lack of any fighter jets capable of undertaking the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) task. Fast jets are also being deployed to Romania to patrol the airspace of NATO member states in the Black Sea region. As the military campaign in Afghanistan has moved to the Resolute Support Mission, the most pressing crisis management challenge for NATO is addressing Russia’s activities in Europe’s eastern and south-eastern regions. Without doubt, the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing instability in Ukraine represents heightened crisis management. The complexity and uncertainty of the instability in this region is unlike anything that NATO endured during the Cold War. A united response to the problems in the east and south-east continues to emerge, with NATO placing additional deterrent forces to the outer edges of its members’ territories. Four multinational battalion-sized (circa 1,000 troops) Battle Groups have begun deploying to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and a multinational framework brigade is being established in Romania. NATO is also boosting its presence in the Black Sea region, “on land, at sea and in the air”. CIVIL EMERGENCIES At the other end of the crisis spectrum lies the civil emergency spectre of humanitarian relief and disaster response. Just as NATO has created a combat capability to deal with armed conflict, it has also put in place a structure and methodology for helping nations who are struck by environmental, health or CNI (critical national infrastructure) disasters. The Euro- Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), established in 1998, is the hub for these activities and has been extremely busy responding to disasters and training others to cope with them. Recent operations in which the EADRCC has been involved include forest fires in Israel, the Ebola virus in West Africa, floods in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the refugee influx from Iraq and Syria. On the CNI front, NATO helped Ukraine and Moldova when atrocious floods and snowfall took down power transmission cables in 2008. NATO’s ability to manage crises is an evolving capability that will remain a vital tool in the Alliance’s kitbag. The utility this provides the United Nations is second to none, as there are no other military organisations with the scale and range of expertise that can manage these types of situations with a ready-made decision-making, planning and execution process. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Developing Modern Defence Capabilities: Exercising a forward presence
PUBLISHED: March 13, 2018
Coordination and cooperation are the foundations of NATO’s work to strengthen defence capabilities, with numerous exercises focused on Eastern Europe following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Chris Aaron looks at how NATO members are working together in training and exercise programmes In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014, NATO increased the number of exercises it holds annually and raised the number of troops directly involved. The UK, for example, increased the number of personnel deployed on NATO exercises from about 2,000 in 2012-13 to more than 9,000 in 2016. Many of these exercises have taken place in the Baltic states and Poland, or have focused on practising deployment of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and its new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) element. In 2015, NATO held more than 300 exercises, including Trident Juncture, which involved 36,000 personnel in a test of the NRF and Operation Dragoon Ride, a US-led exercise involving the transfer of men and materiel across 1,900km of allied territory in Eastern Europe. Noble Jump 2017 in Poland was the first big test for the VJTF. NATO exercises in Poland and the Baltics in 2016 included Anakonda, BALTOPS, Brilliant Jump, Flaming Sword, Flaming Thunder, Iron Wolf, Sabre Strike and Swift Response, illustrating the range and number of significant exercises focused on this region. Overall, the increase in activity signalled NATO’s commitment to collective defence in the face of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine, and emphasised its forward presence. STRUCTURING EXERCISES When NATO agreed on a Readiness Action Plan at the Wales Summit in 2014, it outlined a mix of ‘Assurance’ and ‘Adaptive’ tasks based on the need for short-term measures to bolster NATO’s eastern flank, as well as actions to adjust NATO’s posture for the medium term. The increase in multinational training and exercises described above was a relatively quick way of signalling NATO’s commitment to collective defence, and formed the basis for training rotating elements that would constitute a persistent multinational force in these regions. In this way, the Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET) and the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (CJET) were born. TACET started out in June 2015 as a US-German initiative to support the Baltic states and Poland, but was quickly joined by the UK, and now numbers 15 participant states. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Norway agreed to take part in February 2016. Through training and exercise programmes and the deployment of specialist companies to share expertise, TACET has strengthened the defence capabilities of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and increased their interoperability with the NATO partner forces deployed on their territory. This has aided the integration process that is required as force elements are rotated in and out of the region to make up the Multinational Battalion Battle Groups that are being deployed in the Baltic states and Poland. CJET took form in June 2016, when the NATO Warsaw Summit decided to develop a ‘tailored forward presence’ in the Black Sea states of Bulgaria and Romania, based on a multinational framework brigade in Romania. CJET provides a TACET-like training, exercise and interoperability function for the forces deployed for this brigade. The Multinational Corps Northeast Headquarters in Szczecin, Poland, will oversee the TACET objectives and activities in its area of responsibility, as will the Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) Headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, for CJET. Both TACET and CJET will work closely with the six NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) that have been established to coordinate the deployment and integration of NATO force elements in their respective countries: TACET is linked to the NFIUs based in Bydgoszcz (Poland), Riga (Latvia), Tallinn (Estonia) and Vilnius (Lithuania), while CJET works with the NFIUs in Bucharest (Romania) and Sofia (Bulgaria). Coordination of exercises and training between NATO and the EU is another important development, fostering cooperation on the ground at the same time as higher-staff-level interactions are being increased and improved. Examples of this increased cooperation began in 2003 with the first Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03). _ese have continued ever since, and this year will see another CME/CMX, with a Multi-Layer Crisis Management Exercise in 2018. These will involve parallel and coordinated activities on the part of both the EU and NATO. Staff from both organisations will participate in the planning, conduct and lessons-learned stages of each exercise. DEEPER UNDERSTANDING The aim of such cooperation is to deepen each organisation’s understanding of the other’s protocols and concerns, at both the political and practical operational levels. One example might be the logistical and political issues involved in moving equipment across European borders in a crisis: identifying and resolving issues beforehand – through coordinated exercises similar to Dragoon Ride – will directly strengthen the posture of collective, responsive defence that is now taking shape. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
NATO's Cyber Defence Pledge: Developing the NATO cyber defence capability and capacity
PUBLISHED: March 9, 2018
With millions of suspicious cyber events a day, NATO has to defend its networks on a constant basis. Simon Michell reviews the capabilities in pace to achieve this Cybersecurity is not a theoretical challenge for NATO. It is a daily game of cat and mouse, played out between its computer network experts and a host of malevolent hackers from around the world. The scale is immense, as Ian West, NATO’s chief of cyber security, explains: “Every single day our sensors detect around 240 million suspicious events.” Fortunately, most of these are dealt with automatically, enabling NATO analysts to focus in on what West terms the “needle in the haystack. The ones that we really need to do something about”. This reduces that 240 million daily incidents down to a more manageable 4,000 a year. It was as recent as 2014 that NATO’s own websites came under a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS), blocking access to users. As a part of a long-standing process to combat this growing threat, NATO announced a Cyber Defence Pledge during the 2016 Warsaw Summit. “In recognition of the new realities of security threats to NATO, we, the Allied Heads of State and Government, pledge to ensure the Alliance keeps pace with the fast-evolving cyber threat landscape and that our nations will be capable of defending themselves in cyberspace as in the air, on land and at sea.” The top priority is the protection of the communications systems owned and operated by the Alliance. Consequently, NATO now has four operational domains – land, sea, air and cyber. This new operational domain is guided by the NATO Cyber Defence Committee (NCDC), the NATO Cyber Defence Management Board (NCDMB) and the Consultation, Control and Command Board (C3B). They have at their disposal a raft of capabilities and capacities to address the cyber challenge. A key part of this capability, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tallinn, Estonia, is relatively new, having been created in 2008. The Cyber Test Range is even newer, having been originally created by the Estonians in 2011. It received a welcome boost in July 2014, when NATO decided to establish the Alliance’s cyber range using this existing Estonian one in Tartu. In June 2016, NATO’s governing body, the North Atlantic Council, agreed a further capability enhancement to the range, enabling the expansion of the annual cyber defence exercises, Cyber Coalition and Locked Shields. It will also bring about more advanced testing of complex IT systems. PROTECTING NATO NETWORKS NATO is clear in its understanding that it must be able to protect its own networks and, to do this, it has established the Belgium-based NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). This is responsible for the cyber defence of all NATO sites – static, mobile, and those deployed on operations. The NCIRC Technical Centre in Mons is, according to NATO, “the nerve centre for the Alliance’s fight against cybercrime”. Its main protagonists are the Cyber Threat Assessment Cell and the Cyber Rapid Reaction Teams. Together, they not only keep an eye on the Alliance networks, they also send out emergency assistance to those within the Alliance who have suffered an attack. This can be a very complicated and exhaustive activity, which NATO likens to defending a skyscraper where the defenders must close each door and every window, but the hackers only have to find one that has been left slightly ajar to sneak in unobserved. With education being an enabler for cyber defence, NATO is fortunate in being able to lean on a network of institutions to build the necessary skills and deliver relevant training. For example, the NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS), which will be moving its headquarters to Portugal from its current home in Latina, Italy, delivers a range of courses to train staff in the dark arts of cybersecurity. The NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, complements this capability with its own syllabus of cyber education and training. And, at a somewhat loftier level, the NATO Defence College in Rome has gained an enviable reputation for its strategic thinking on matters concerning both the political and military arenas, of which cyber issues is increasingly prominent. Just like all things related to information technology, the pace of change is rapid, and standing still is a recipe for disaster. Realising this, NATO agreed an updated Cyber Defence Plan in February 2017 to increase the Allies’ ability to work together, develop capabilities and share information. One adaptation that the Alliance is making to its response to complex cyber challenges is increased and fairer burden-sharing, which will ultimately give better protection to all member states. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Projecting Stability: Standing Guard
PUBLISHED: March 6, 2018
Over the years, NATO has established and adapted an agile force structure and technological infrastructure that defends Alliance member states from attack on a daily basis, writes Simon Michell In times of heightened tension, NATO can rapidly call upon the military resources of its 29 member states, as well as, if appropriate, those of partner nations. However, the Alliance also maintains standing forces that are on constant watch across the air, land and sea of the European territories, regardless of the prevailing level of uncertainty. These forces are, for the most part, complementary to the NATO Response Force (NRF) elements that stand at high and very high states of readiness in case of a sudden need to respond to an incident. That said, the four Standing NATO Maritime Groups (two mine countermeasures and two maritime security) that patrol the North Atlantic, as well as the North, Mediterranean and Aegean seas and, periodically, waters east of the Suez Canal, are integral parts of the NRF and are becoming ever more closely integrated with it. NATO is intent on revamping its maritime forces, and is, in its own words, “reinvigorating the Standing Naval Forces (SNF) so that, inter alia, they meet the requirements of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) Maritime, as reiterated in the Warsaw summit in 2016.” The SNF will now begin to operate more frequently in the Black Sea Region. On land, and despite the drawdown of American and Canadian troops from Europe that began after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are still considerable numbers of North American forces stationed on the continent, together with a growing volume of pre-positioned stocks and equipment. Alongside the domestic NATO forces, the US has augmented the 65,000 military personnel it keeps in Europe. For its part, Canada has also recently agreed to expand the number of troops it sends across the Atlantic to European shores, as the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula has precipitated a bolstering of defences across NATO’s eastern and southern borders with Russia. There is also an impressive amount of military infrastructure that has either been in service for many years, or is in the process of implementation and on the verge of full operational capability. This includes systems to defend against ballistic missile attacks, air command and control networks, and airborne surveillance platforms. ALLIANCE GROUND SURVEILLANCE The five Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) RQ-4B Block 40 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles that are being procured on behalf of NATO by a consortium of 15 Alliance members are expected to have entered service by the end of 2018. They will be operated by a NATO component based at Italy’s Sigonella air base in support of the NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative. Once in service, they will protect ground forces by finding, identifying and targeting moving vehicles and other threats on the ground. They will join NATO’s efforts to persistently counter potential attacks on deployed forces and civilian populations and will play a key role in addressing hybrid warfare and terrorism. AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM Now achieving early operational capability, NATO’s Air Command and Control System (ACCS) is revolutionising the way in which the Alliance defends itself against attack from the air by integrating almost all of NATO’s airspace under one system. The final goal is to incorporate ballistic missile defence to create the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). This unprecedented system is on a scale not replicated by any other military alliance and comprises 300 air surveillance sensor sites, 550 external systems in 800 different locations, and 27 operational site locations to watch over 81 million square kilometres of airspace. Should the need arise, there is also a deployable ACCS that NATO can take on operations when it leaves the static ACCS coverage. E-3 AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS NATO’s E-3A airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) component – the unmistakable squadron of Boeing 707s with huge nine-metre rotodomes on their backs – represents the Alliance’s sole currently owned and operated unit. This unique organisation has been operating with multinational crews from its base at Geilenkirchen for almost 35 years and will hopefully continue until 2030. In order to make this continued service possible, the aircraft are being upgraded with modern digital systems and glass cockpits, which are becoming mandatory in some of the airspace in which the aircraft may undertake future missions. The component’s primary task of keeping up a constant watch for low-flying enemy aircraft and directing NATO interceptors to neutralise them is a critical requirement for NATO, and one that it will maintain for the foreseeable future, necessitating their eventual replacement. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Developing Modern Defence Capabilities: Supply and demand
PUBLISHED: March 2, 2018
Business is booming at the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) in support of NATO’s acquisition and logistics needs. Anne Paylor reports The role of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) is expanding both in scope and activity as NATO nations and partners rely increasingly on contracted solutions to meet their military operational logistics requirements. During the recently concluded NATO Agency Reform, three former agencies – the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, the Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency and the NATO Airlift Management Agency – were merged to form the NATO Support Agency. “NSPA is now NATO’s principal logistics provider, tasked with assisting NATO nations with common procurement and supply of spare parts, and arranging maintenance and repair services necessary for the support of various weapon and other systems,” explains NSPA General Manager Peter Dohmen. In April 2015, NATO further assigned the acquisition role to NSPA, enabling whole-system acquisition and consolidating all of NATO’s logistics and procurement support activities under one roof as the NSPA. “Turnover is growing rapidly and all indications are that it will continue to grow,” says Dohmen. “The agency is predominantly customer-funded, operating on a ‘no profit, no loss’ basis. In 2016, 96% of our revenue came directly from member nations who used our services, with just 4% from NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) programmes that are eligible for common funding.” In 2016, more than 35,000 contracts for products and services were let using the Agency’s extensive industry source file of more than 10,000 active companies. Those contracts were worth €3.5 billion, a substantial increase from the €1 billion turnover recorded just a decade ago. Reflecting the activities of the merged agencies, the NSPA is organised into three business segments – the NATO Airlift Management Programme (NAM), the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) programme and Logistics Operations (Log Ops). It has a full-time staff of 1,300 international civilians, based mostly in Capellen, Luxembourg. Capellen is also home to Log Ops, which accounts for almost 80% of NSPA’s overall business. “Log Ops is involved in all phases of the equipment life cycle, from procurement and in-service support through to disposal when equipment is no longer needed. These logistics capabilities and services are provided using multinational legal frameworks, as well as bilateral and multinational agreements that enable the consolidation and centralisation of logistics management functions for NATO, its member nations and partner countries,” Dohmen reveals. IN-HOUSE CAPABILITIES Most support is provided through outsourced contracts awarded through international competitive bidding processes. NSPA also offers an in-house engineering and technical support capability of specific technologies and services, such as optoelectronics, calibration and data management. A further 50 staff are based in Pápa, Hungary, supporting the NAM fleet of three Boeing C-17 Globemaster aircraft stationed there. These aircraft can operate in less benign environments than their civil counterparts and support NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). A joint international initiative between the 10 NATO SAC Member States, plus Partnership for Peace (PfP) states Finland and Sweden, C-17 flying hours are pre-agreed on an annual basis, with the aircraft available for third-party use via SAC Nation sponsorship. This arrangement enables participating states to collectively own assets that would be prohibitively expensive to purchase individually. NSPA is also enabling a European initiative for air-to-air refuelling and strategic airlift with the acquisition, through the European Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation (OCCAR), of multi-role tanker/transport (MRTT) Airbus A330-200 aircraft. A further 35 full-time staff are based at Versailles, France, operating the CEPS, one of the NATO pipeline systems and the only one that is a multinational, integrated cross-border fuel transport and storage system. CROSS-BORDER LINKAGES The CEPS comprises 5,300 km of pipeline linking civil depots, military and civil airfields, refineries and sea ports. About 70% of the fuel transported through the CEPS is jet fuel, and through its military/commercial business model fuel is supplied to major European airports while retaining a military priority use when required. Diesel and gasoline account for a further 20%. Fifty staff are based in Taranto, Italy, manning the Southern Operational Centre, where NATO’s deployable headquarters camps are stored and maintained, ready to be deployed in support of NATO operations and exercises. Although NSPA remains committed to operations in Afghanistan and is also supporting operations in Kosovo, Iraq and Mali, Dohmen says that the focus is shifting more towards Europe. “Geopolitical changes mean there is more emphasis now on the European theatre and deterrence and defence. Agency support to NATO’s Response Force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and enhanced Forward Presence is under way and we expect this activity to continue to grow,” he concludes. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Collective Defence- NATO's Mission: Deterring Russia: NATO's biggest challenge
PUBLISHED: February 27, 2018
Coherent tactics need to be employed by NATO if the Alliance is to dissuade Russia from flexing its muscles, but there are cracks in the current approach, say Stratfor’s Omar Lamrani and Sim Tack Since its founding, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has existed for two reasons: to provide collective defence and deterrence. But the threats that those aims are intended to guard against or prevent have not been as static as the goals themselves. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse – and with it, the apparent end of the Cold War – the question of just who or what the Alliance is still protecting itself from has moved to the fore of Western policymaking. Yet the biggest threat to NATO is still, without question, Russia. After all, no other country boasts the same strength within immediate striking distance of Europe. Though Russia’s conventional capabilities pale in comparison to the vast military force the Soviet Union mustered during the Cold War, its demonstrated use of many different types of tools, including asymmetric ones, has made it a much more complex adversary. And, as its recent actions in Georgia and Ukraine (and, many suspect, the Baltics) attest, Russia isn’t shy about using aggression as a means to achieve its ends. Hybrid warfare has proved a particularly difficult threat to address collectively. As a concept, hybrid warfare is both strategically and tactically harder to grasp than the more straightforward conventional force that NATO was built to discourage. Formulating a range of appropriate responses to hybrid warfare will be crucial to keeping the NATO deterrent relevant in the face of Russia’s attempts to weaken the bloc’s resolve through asymmetric methods. Meanwhile, Russia remains the only power able to pose an existential threat to NATO members. Moscow has made it clear that it will not hesitate to use its nuclear arsenal, which is on a par with the Alliance’s, first in the event that its most vital national security interests are jeopardized. THREATS FROM THE EAST NATO’s members haven’t been oblivious to the threat emanating from the east. The Alliance has deployed its troops to Russia’s periphery to enhance the credibility of its deterrent. The move has had the added benefit of rallying the bloc’s resolve somewhat, showing Central and Eastern European states on Russia’s doorstep that NATO is committed to their protection. As a tripwire force, these units also serve as part of a layered defence against conventional attacks by the Russian military. And NATO has taken care to broadcast its movements all the while, sending a clear warning to Moscow – a necessary part of any true deterrent. There are still several chinks, however, in the armour the Alliance has tried to forge. Perhaps one of the largest is lodged in the heart of NATO itself: Article 5. Often quoted as the cornerstone of the collective defence principle, the article requires members to unanimously agree that a threat amounts to an attack on the entire Alliance, only to then permit states to choose whether and how to participate in the bloc’s response. So, the article touted as the foundation of collective defence may actually be its greatest vulnerability, because it relies on the political resolve of individual members – something that cannot always be guaranteed. This, in turn, could cause NATO’s deterrence to crumble if hostile powers believe that a lack of decisiveness among members will hamper their ability to respond in a crisis. If that belief proves accurate, and individual states’ interests do indeed fail to align when the Alliance comes under attack, its defences could fall. THE NEED FOR DEFENCE ON ALL FRONTS The recent deployment of battalion battle groups to NATO’s eastern flank is not as effective a move as it may seem, either. Though it has showcased the bloc’s resolve in fending off the Russian military’s advances, it won’t be much use against anything less than a direct conventional attack. For example, Moscow could seek to sow confusion and discord among NATO allies by turning to less transparent measures, such as fomenting or supporting local insurgencies, conducting cyber attacks and launching a coordinated propaganda campaign against its Western adversary. Russia, moreover, doesn’t have to take action in NATO’s territory to interfere with its interests. The Kremlin has leverage throughout the Alliance’s periphery – including in Syria, where civil war has created a breeding ground for terrorism and immigration issues, and Afghanistan, where Russia has reportedly stepped up its support for the Taliban – that it can wield, to the detriment of NATO states. The bloc’s deterrence strategy must therefore look beyond its own borders if it hopes to adequately protect its interests. THE UPPER HAND Even within NATO itself, Enhanced Forward Presence alone cannot guarantee deterrence. For instance, though it is certainly unlikely that Russia would launch a blatant attack on the Baltic States, it is possible, and Moscow would have some clear advantages if it did. In numerous war games, Russia’s mobilisation advantage and proximate lines of communication have been shown to improve its prospects of overtaking the Baltics before a NATO response force could arrive. In addition, NATO has not yet designed a coherent plan for addressing Russia’s ability to leverage its tactical nuclear weapons in the wake of an incursion to dissuade any counterattack. If the Alliance allows Russia to believe that it can “escalate to deescalate” in this manner, the Kremlin will have less incentive to avoid encroaching on its neighbours’ territory. FLAWS THAT COULD BE FATAL NATO has come a long way since the end of the Cold War, and its combined military power remains unrivalled. But its need for a coherent collective defence and deterrence strategy has not diminished. If the bloc does not work to understand and overcome the flaws inherent to its current approach, it will no longer be able to rely on its capacity to dissuade Moscow from testing its mettle. And if the Alliance is unable or unwilling to stand together to effectively deter Russia, its reason for existence may no longer hold. Omar Lamrani is a senior military analyst at Stratfor who focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine in several regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master’s degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. Sim Tack is a senior analyst at Stratfor who tracks and analyses global military developments on a tactical and strategic level. He has studied the development of the Russian military, as well as the structure and operations of NATO. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
Projecting Stability: Adapting the NATO Readiness Action Plan
PUBLISHED: February 23, 2018
Mike Bryant highlights NATO’s efforts to reinforce its ability to provide collective defence to the east and south-east of its members’ territory via an enhanced military capability NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit of Alliance partners. Intended to ensure that NATO can always respond “swiftly and firmly” to any security challenges from the east and the south, the Alliance has, over the past three years, moved ahead with the various component strategies of the plan. A number of immediate assurance measures were implemented as part of the effort to reassure NATO’s Central and Eastern European members that they would be protected from any potential aggression from Russia. These measures included bolstering land, maritime and air activities in the relevant areas and undertaking a series of exercises focused on collective defence. The RAP also included longer-term adaptation measures to meet the evolving threat, including significantly improving the capability of the NATO Response Force (NRF); creating a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); establishing a number of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) in Eastern Europe; plus a range of measures designed to enhance the capabilities of the Alliance’s multinational forces. In each of these areas, much progress has been made. THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE The NRF is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force, taking in land, air, maritime and special forces elements that can be quickly deployed wherever required. As well as its operational role, the NRF – which was initially launched in 2002 – is also seen as a tool for promoting collaboration in education and training, facilitating increased numbers of exercises and promoting better use of technology among the NATO allies. The RAP’s adaptation measures included a trebling of the NRF’s strength. In June 2015, NATO defence ministers confirmed that the enhanced NRF would be made up of 40,000 personnel. Command over the NRF lies in the hands of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The defence ministers also confirmed that a wide-ranging, multinational exercise, Trident Juncture 2015, would show off the enhanced NRF’s capabilities. In addition, a broader and more demanding exercise programme was to be launched from 2016, with the NRF a key element of the exercises. At the same meeting, ministers agreed to speed up political and military decision-making and to set up graduated response plans that enable executable operations plans to be generated “exceptionally quickly”. NATO partners confirmed that a new standing joint logistics support group headquarters would be established to support the movement of forces across the Alliance’s territory more quickly and efficiently. The RAP also called for the creation of the VJTF, a “spearhead force” within the NRF that is able to deploy at very short notice. NATO defence ministers agreed in February 2015 that this would consist of a land formation of 5,000 troops supported by air, maritime and special forces elements, and that it would be operational by the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The lead role on the VJTF rotates around NATO members, and in mid 2015 1,500 troops tested whether the Interim VJTF could deploy within 48 hours of an order to move as intended. Exercise Noble Jump saw the VJTF deployed for the first time as a total of 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations deployed to Żagań, Poland. The exercise marked the first time that these forces had conducted tactical manoeuvres under the enhanced NRF framework. INTEGRATION UNTS In late 2015, Exercise Trident Juncture – which involved exercises on and over land and sea across large parts of Alliance territory– saw the VJTF tested and certified for 2016. The exercise also certified the NRF headquarters for 2016: Joint Force Command (JFC) Brunssum. The RAP has seen the creation of eight new NFIUs – which are effectively small headquarters – across Central and Eastern Europe. In September 2015, NFIUs were inaugurated in Sofia in Bulgaria, Tallinn in Estonia, Riga in Latvia, Vilnius in Lithuania, Bydgoszcz in Poland and Bucharest in Romania; in November 2016 the NFIU in Hungary was inaugurated, and the final NFIU, in Slovakia, was inaugurated in January 2017. Each NFIU is able to help facilitate the rapid deployment of forces to the Eastern region of NATO, support defence planning and assist in coordinating training and exercises. Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin, Poland and Multinational Division Southeast in Bucharest, Romania have also been created. These high-readiness headquarters are able to command forces within their respective regions and act as hubs for regional cooperation among NATO members. Finally, NATO multinational force capability has been strengthened in relation to many other formations and deployments. For example, Standing Naval Forces have been enhanced as part of the RAP’s adaptation measures so that they meet the needs of the VJTF (Maritime) force. MEETING EVOLVING THREATS In January 2017, the UK-based Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) took over as the Land Component Command of the 2017 NRF from NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Spain. At the same time, the UK’s 20th Armoured Infantry Brigade took over as NATO’s VJTF (Land) force. The process of improvement and expansion as laid out in the RAP is still ongoing, but the progress made up to now clearly shows the level of determination that NATO has to effectively meet evolving challenges to the Alliance’s security. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
NATO's Cyber Defence Pledge: NATO's new digital chief
PUBLISHED: February 20, 2018
Kevin J Scheid took the helm of the NATO’s tech and cyber arms, the NATO communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), on 1 July, becoming the first senior US official to head the organization. He outlines some of his priorities as takes up his post at a time of fundamental change in NATO’s tech landscape Q. HOW ARE YOU SETTLING IN AS THE NEW GENERAL MANGER OF THE  NCI AGENCY? A.  At the end of September, I completed a 90-day assessment and will now be developing, together with our Supervisory Board, a three-year strategy, aiming to have it approved at the Board’s November meeting. I am optimistic and impressed with the talent in the Agency. Obviously, there are challenges we need to address; the Agency is the result of a merger of five distinct NATO bodies in 2012 and is emerging from a major period of transformation. In the development of the strategy, I am collaborating closely with the Agency Supervisory Board, the NATO leadership and the military commands to ensure their concerns and ambitions for the Agency are fully understood and reflected. At the core of the NCI Agency is not technology or big programmes. At its core are its people – a tremendous collection of talented men and women, personnel who work together daily in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Norfolk, VA, and locations across Europe to solve problems, deliver services and work with industry to deliver the capabilities that allow NATO to preserve peace and project stability worldwide. This is the greatest reward of the General Manager – to work with such a capable, diverse, international team who have dedicated themselves to no less a goal than world peace. I am excited about the work ahead. Q. WHAT PLANS DO YOU HAVE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE AGENCY? A.  Improved service and programme delivery will be my key focus, enabled by strengthening the Agency’s human talent capital. This should be seen in a wider strategic context. The scope of the Agency’s responsibility is large – missile defense, air command and control, cyber security, the modernisation of the NATO IT infrastructure and critical services that the Agency provides to the political leadership and military command structure; we need to ensure that we are on time, scope and budget. Seventy per cent of our work is executed through contracts with the Industries of our Member Nations and I am looking forward to continuing to expand our partnership with Industry; in particular, to continue to seek ways of getting capabilities deployed faster, in pace with technological change. Today, some economists are speaking about a “golden decade” ahead of us in Europe; and the economies of North America are well into a significant period of growth and expansion. Nations are investing more in defence and expanding their capabilities in information technology, cyber security, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. These are the Agency’s core capabilities and I believe we will see growing demand for the Agency’s capability development skills and thought leadership across Europe. Q. WHY IS CYBERSECURITY A KEY NATO CAPABILITY? A. One aspect is the nature of modern capabilities – be they ground vehicles, or fighter planes (take the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, for instance) – they are inherently networked. So cyber defence is becoming a key aspect of all capability development. There is also the fundamental nature of the Alliance – we bring together the forces of the Nations into a cohesive, multinational force. Command and control – via networks– is at the heart of that and needs to be defended. If a bank gets hacked, they lose lots of money; with us, lives are at risk. Timely access to data and information is also a critical resource, as it enables the North Atlantic Council’s decision-making. My final point would be that we live in a digital world, and our economies are digital – this is why, at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, our Heads of State and Government stressed that “cyber attacks present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack.” It is a challenging mission but we have a world-class team that fits the battle every day, 24/7. Kevin J Scheid has served the Federal Government for over 30 years in progressively senior positions at the White House, Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense. In November 2016, he was selected by the Member Nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to serve as General Manage, NATO Communications and Information Agency, effective 1 July 2017. Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017 For the occasion of the NATO Special Meeting in May 2017, ATA has published a dedicated monograph where high level policy makers and experts tackle the strategic issues of the summit. This publication was distributed to all the delegations and representatives that were taking part to closed-doors discussions and parallel meetings that took place before and during the Summit. The publication is available in its entirety here:  Projecting Stability | ATA special publication for the Brussels Summit 2017
By: Atlantic Treaty Association
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GLOBSEC | 17-19 May 2018, Slovakia
GLOBSEC is a prominent annual conference on the most pressing European political, economic and financial issues with an ambitious goal – to contribute to the shaping of the future of Europe. Since its foundation, it has become an indispensable meeting place of hundreds of governmental and EU representatives, experts and private sector. Over the years, it has made a significant contribution to defining challenges, solutions and actions of the regional and wider European agenda.

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The Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA) is an organization of 38 national chapters that, since 1954 has been conducting analyses, training, education, and information activities on foreign affairs and security issues relevant to the Atlantic Alliance. ATA draws together political leaders, diplomats, civilian and military officers, academics, economic actors as well as young professionals and students in an effort to further the values set forth in the North Atlantic Treaty.